This paper introduces and evaluates the performance of a novel cipher scheme, Ambiguous Multi-Symmetric Cryptography (AMSC), which conceals multiple coherent plain-texts in one cipher-text. The cipher-text can be decrypted by different keys to produce different plain-texts. Security analysis showed that AMSC is secure against cipher-text only and known plain-text attacks. AMSC has the following applications: 1) it can send multiple messages for multiple receivers through one cipher-text; 2) it can send one real message and multiple decoys for camouflage; and 3) it can send one real message to one receiver using parallel processing. Performance comparison with leading symmetric algorithms (DES, AES and RC6) demonstrated AMSC's efficiency in execution time.
Introduction
Deniable encryption prevents attackers from knowing with certainty whether or not a particular sender or receiver can be linked to a specific plain-text message. This paper addresses the deniable encryption problem by proposing a new cipher scheme, Ambiguous Multi-Symmetric Cryptography (AMSC), which conceals multiple plain-texts, each with its own key, in one cipher-text. The deniable encryption problem is important because most encryption schemes are defenseless against an attacker once she possesses the key. Deniable encryption provides against offline and brute force attacks on the encrypted data, as they provide multiple decoy coherent messages to fool the adversary. Unfortunately, they cannot be used for online secure communications.
Ideally, we want a deniable encryption scheme that: 1) Defends both communication parties against decryption key exposure. 2) Has good performance in both encryption and decryption. 3) Is secure against different attack models. For a), AMSC defends both sender and receiver by providing multiple decoy keys.
As for b), AMSC has an initialization phase that speeds up the original encryption [4] tremendously. For c), we introduce a security operation in the encryption step that helps secure AMSC against Cipher-text only and Known plain-text attacks.
This problem is non-trivial due to the complexity of concealing multiple messages into one message. This problem can simply be solved by encrypting n messages and concatenating the sub cipher-texts into one cipher-text. However, this could lead to rubber-hose cryptanalysis [5] on the receiver if the adversary observes that sub cipher-texts and not the whole cipher-text is being decrypted.
The adversary will continue to use force on the receiver to reveal more possible messages. Another problem with this approach happens if the adversary intercepts parts of the whole cipher-text. Theoretically, it could reveal one or more concatenated messages. While a partial cipher-text in AMSC does not reveal any message.
AMSC's applications include multicast messaging and broadcast encryption.
One video channel could generate multiple unique channels for different receivers. A second application is to deny the correct plain-text and key from the adversary by providing decoys. The third application is to use parallel computing to split one message into chunks and encrypt it using AMSC. This is possible due to the independent encryption operations that can run on different cores in parallel. This allows for faster encryption of a single message.
The primary contributions of this paper are as follows. First, compared with [4] , the encryption performance is enhanced by introducing a new algorithm. Second, the security is improved by introducing an extra operation in the encryption process, without affecting performance. Third, AMSC's performance is compared to leading symmetric algorithms like DES, AES and RC6. Fourth, the security analysis is researched in more detail, notably the security of keys used, in addition to introducing another probabilistic approach. Fifth, computa- The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background and related work, and compares our scheme to others. Section 3 defines the scheme. Section 4 proposes a new algorithm and presents its applications.
Section 5 studies the security and possible attacks and shows a probabilistic solution. Section 6 examines the time complexity. Section 7 shows the results of our experiments.
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Background and Related Work
Canetti et al. [1] proposed a "Deniable Encryption", which is a theoretical approach to deny someone the original plain-text when they get hold of the cipher-text and the right decryption key. Assume that Bob sends an encrypted message to Alice, and later on, Trudy holds Bob hostage until Bob releases the key. The released key will provide a fake plain-text. Canetti distinguished between two models:
1) multi-distributional deniability, requires the users to know in advance which messages they might want to conceal, whereas 2) full deniability, allows the user to decide afterward
Canetti presented a sender deniable scheme, using this first model. They also constructed a receiver deniable scheme that requires an additional round of interaction, and a sender-receiver-deniable protocol that relies on third parties.
One proposed scheme for denying symmetric encryption by Canetti would be to give n alternative messages to encrypt, and use n different keys, then construct the cipher-text as the concatenation of the encryption of all messages as shown in Figure 1 . This is called a plan ahead scheme, where the i-th message is encrypted using the i-th key. ONeill et al. [6] provided a public key solution, where both sender and receiver can use deniability without relying on any third party. The solution is based on Multi-distributional deniability. They defined a new term "bi-deniable encryption" which allows a sender in possession of the receiver's public key to communicate a message to the latter, confidentially. Additionally, if the parties are later coerced to reveal all their secret data namely, the coins used by the sender to encrypt her message and/or those used by the receiver to generate her key, bi-deniable encryption allows them to do so as if any desired message (possibly chosen as late as at the time of coercion) had been encrypted.
Sahai et al. [7] defined an identity based encryption (IBE), which allows sending an encrypted message to an identity without using a public key certificate. A user with a secret key K for the identity w is able to decrypt a cipher-text encrypted with the public key w′ IFF w and w′ are within a certain distance of each other by some metric. A document for example can be decrypted by a certain identity or group. They use biometric for IBE to generate , A k n -threshold scheme as a method of sharing a secret S among a set of n participants in such a way that any k participants can compute the value of the secret, but no group of k − 1 or fewer can do so. The Chinese remainder theorem can be used to construct the secret S like in Mignotte's [9] and Asmuth-Bloom's Schemes [10] . However, it differs, as the secret points to one message, and k shares are needed to solve it using CRT.
AMSC Scheme
Our scheme conceals various plain-texts into one cipher-text, hence the name "Multi-Symmetric". Figure 2 shows the system model. The scheme can be defined in three steps:
1) Alice exchanges a number of AMSC co-prime keys with Bob. For added security, Alice can also exchange X which is the multiplication of all keys. 
3) Bob decrypts C using key i K and gets i P . Table 1 shows a glossary of symbols used in this paper.
AMSC Algorithm
In this section, we present a new algorithm (AMSC v3) that satisfies the previous scheme. This algorithm enhances the performance of the two algorithms presented in [4] by introducing an initialization phase. This speeds up AMSC tremendously. Furthermore, the security is enhanced by adding an XOR operation to the encryption as a final step between the cipher-text and the multiplication of all keys. This strengthens the AMSC algorithm against the known plain-text attacks as explained in more detail in Section 5.1.2. The security and performance will be further discussed in Sections 5 and 7.
The AMSC algorithm is based on the Chinese Remainder theorem (CRT) [11] that is used to calculate the cipher-text. 
The multiplications of all keys (1, ···, n)
The roots of the extended-GCD algorithm such that CRT Theorem: Suppose that 1 2 , , , n K K K  are pairwise relatively prime positive integers, and let 1 2 , , , n P P P  be integers. Then the system of congruences, ( )
The AMSC algorithm prepares , 1, ,
from above in the initialization step (calculated once). Afterwords, the encryption multiplies all plain-texts 1 , , n P P  with the initialization values and calculates the cipher.
Initialization
The first part initializes AMSC values that are used in encryption. 
Algorithm 1 shows AMSC v3 Initialization.
Encryption
After initialization, subsequent cipher-texts are calculated by:
where i i s X K is calculated in the initialization step. There is an option to XOR the final cipher-text C to X. This will make AMSC secure against known plain-text attacks as discussed in detail in Section 5.
Algorithm 2 shows the steps for AMSC v3 Encryption.
Decryption
The decryption simply takes the cipher-text C and mods it with the corresponding key i K . If the XOR operation is used in the encryption to Journal of Information Security strengthens the cipher, then the input for decryption needs X besides the cipher-text. One important note: If all keys are primes, and the receiver knows X and her key i K , it is not possible to know the rest of the keys as this is a factorization problem. Algorithm 3 shows the steps for AMSC v3 Decryption.
Example
Assume we use prime keys (we can use co-primes as well):
and plain-texts
Using AMSC with no XOR operations, we calculate cipher-text 16394186300320500502435771192868738239953 75900079267888735899798043807086216329 C = − .
Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate our algorithm under a variety of security attack models, including a thorough study on prime and co-prime keys. Then, we present a probabilistic solution for the encryption process.
Security Attack Models

Cipher-Text only Attack [12]
When one cipher-text is intercepted, a brute force attack [13] is one way to crack the encryption. AMSC can use prime or co-prime keys. Both will be analyzed. 1) Primes: The prime number theorem states that there are approximately
The size of the cipher-text depends on three factors: the average block size Pa, the number of blocks n, and the average key size Ka. Table  2 shows how the three factors n, Pa, Ka affect the cipher-text size, along side the number of steps needed to find all prime keys.
2) Co-primes: For any cipher-text C, the number of sets of positive integers ≤ C in which two elements are co-primes lies between counting function of C.
Nathanson [15] improved this in Theorem 2 as follows: 
Using Equation (6), we construct Table 3 to approximate the number of co-prime sets based on the size of cipher-text C and the number of plain-text(s) n. Table 4 shows the number of all co-prime subsets ≤ cipher-text C. It also shows the number of co-prime subsets if C X ⊕ is used.
To find all elements of the co-prime sets we can use different methods:
• n = 2: if we want to find all pair sets that are co-primes ≤ C, we can use the Farey sequence [16] . There exists an algorithm [17] to find all sets ≤ C in ( )
2
O C time complexity.
• n = 3: if we want to find all triplet sets that are co-primes ≤ C, we can use the primitive Pythagorean triples [18] . One formula for finding all primitive triplets ≤ C is the Euclid's Formula. The Time complexity of this formula is
• n > 3: In this case we can examine all subsets where n = 2 and chain them together to generate the subsets with the required n.
3) The XOR operation has been widely used in cryptography, especially in symmetric key cryptography [20] [21] [22] . The security of XOR mainly depends on the key strength, where it must be extremely difficult for the adversary to predict the key. In addition, the key and the message should have the same length to avoid repetition. With these two conditions, the brute force attack is the only possible attack that can be used to break the cipher-text [23] [24] . To break an encrypted message of size n bits, the adversary needs 2 n steps. This process is computationally infeasible even for small values of n.
In this work, we introduce an XOR between the cipher-text C with X (The multiplication of all keys). This is done to break the mathematical pattern. In 
Known Plain-Text Attack [25]
In a classical attack, the adversary can examine one plain-text to its cipher-text and tries to reveal the key. In AMSC, however, the adversary has multiple inputs and one output. We will study two cases. One, where the adversary only knows one plain-text and the rest are unknown, and the second, we assume that all plain-texts are known going into the oracle. 2) n plain-texts are known: The adversary examines n plain-texts and their cipher-texts for each encryption. We end up with n equations for each cipher: Let all plain-texts 1, , 0
Once X is known, subsequent oracle cipher-texts can be XORed with X to produce the original cipher-texts. Afterwords, the GCD can be used to reveal the keys as stated previously. We conclude that AMSC is not secure against this attack if the adversary chooses all plain-texts. We know that chosen plain-text attack and chosen cipher-text attack fail with all deterministic algorithms. Hence we have to use probabilistic approaches as discussed in Section 5.2.
Chosen Cipher-Text Attack (CCA) [27]
This attack happens when the adversary has access to the decryption oracle.
AMSC is not CCA immune in the current form. We can start with 1 C = (Table 5) To mitigate this, when we can add the XOR operation C X ⊕ at the end of encryption, then we would have two cases for X: 1) X is odd: The adversary can find the key by feeding the oracle 1 C = . The reason is:
− . This is due to the add without carry in the XOR operation.
Ex: if ( ) 2 9 1001 X = = and 1
We also know that:
K is a divisor of X. Therefore: Table 5 . Example of chosen cipher-text attack, where
Cipher-text
Plain-text (C mod K i ) 
2) X is even: The previous case will not work. We can choose X to be even by having only one of the keys i K as even. This will strengthens the security of AMSC against CCA attacks.
Deterministic vs. Probabilistic
AMSC is deterministic. We present two approaches to make AMSC probabilistic [28] :
• First approach: We construct:
where 0 C is a base solution using CRT, t is any random integer and LCM is the least common multiplier of all keys. Note that
We can use variable t as a random Initialization vector (IV) to yield different cipher-texts:
• Second approach: We define another probabilistic solution. Let r K , r P be a random key and a random plain-text accordingly. The cipher-text will become:
The random key and plain-text can be re-generated for every encryption. In the encryption phase, we only need to calculate r r r P s X K * * once, and then add it to the cipher-text as a final step. This random key will make the cipher-text probabilistic with a small increase in size. Ex: for n = 4, where average block size 32 a P = and average key size 33 a K = . For a deterministic cipher-text, the average size is about 129 bits. For a probabilistic cipher-text using approach 2 by adding a random key, the size grows to about 163 bits, a difference of about 34 bits. For a probabilistic cipher-text using approach 1 by setting the random IV 150 t = , the cipher-text grows to about 139 bits. For 1500 t = the cipher-text grows to about 143 bits. We compare Equations (8) and (9), and examine the cipher-text size. When n z = , we calculate 
Therefore, Equation (9) will have a smaller cipher-text size than the Equation (8) iff Pr Sr t * < .
Computational Complexity Analysis
We know that multiplication, division and modular operations take ( ) 
log log 2 log 1
the time complexity is:
where n is the number of keys and X is the multiplication of keys.
• In encryption, we loop n times and do an addition and a multiplication of numbers close to X. Therefore, the overall time complexity for encryption is
• To decrypt cipher-text C using key i K , we have a time complexity of Table 6 shows the time complexity for all versions of AMSC. 
Experimental Study Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the new algorithm AMSC v3 against different symmetric algorithms with different key sizes.
Experimental Setup
All experiments were done on an Intel Core i7 3610QM CPU with 8 GB memory. The AMSC core library and the symmetric algorithms comparison were implemented in .NET 4.0 using C# programming language. Each symmetric algorithm is measured in three different phases. The first, is initializing n cipher-text classes and creating n random keys that will be used for encryption/decryption. The second is encrypting n different random plain-texts using the previous keys accordingly, and then concatenating the sub cipher-texts. This gives us a fair comparison to AMSC. On the decryption side, Table 6 . Time complexity analysis of AMSC 1, 2 [4] , and 3.
log 1
we decrypt each sub-cipher-text by the its key to get back the original plain-text.
We run each operation a total of 100,000 times and take the average. Table 7 defines the legends that are used in the results. Figure 3 compares the execution time of AMSC's initialization to that of DES, AES and RC6. The initialization time for the symmetric algorithm includes initializing n cipher-texts objects with n random keys, and getting them ready for encryption or decryption. 
Experimental Results
Initialization: AMSC, DES, AES and RC6
Encryption: AMSC, DES, AES and RC6
For symmetric algorithms we encrypt n plain-texts using n keys for the n cipher-text objects that were initialized, and then concatenate all the sub cipher-texts into one final cipher-text. This makes it fair to compare against AMSC. Figure 4 (a) compares the execution time of AMSC encryption to that of until about 4 plain-texts. This is due to the multiplication of large numbers as n increases. As for RC6, AMSC is slower.
Decryption: AMSC, DES, AES and RC6
The total AMSC time to decrypt the same cipher-text into n plain-text messages using n keys is measured. For the symmetric algorithms, n sub cipher-texts are decrypted and time is measured. Figure 5 (a) shows that AMSC is faster than DES. Figure 5(b) shows that AMSC 129-bit beats both AES 128-bit and AES 256-bit. However, AMSC 257-bit is slower than AES due to the time it takes to divide the large cipher-text by each key. 
Conclusions
Deniable encryption offers an additional layer of protection for senders and receivers, who may be forced to give up encryption keys, or who may find it advantageous to have multiple plain-texts in one cipher-text. This paper showed that a novel system, ASMC, conceals multiple plain-texts in one cipher-text and performs competitively with more mainstream encryption techniques.
This paper showed that AMSC is a method for multi-key encoding and deniable encryption that withstands COA and KPA security attacks. AMSC's performance in initialization is faster than DES 64-bit but a little slower than AES. In Encryption, however, AMSC 129-bit is about 42% faster than AES 128-bit. On the decryption side, AMSC 129-bit is about 110% faster than DES 64-bit and 16% faster than AES 128-bit for 5 plain-texts.
Our future work in this area includes applying parallel computing to AMSC.
We also like to explore different applications of AMSC in TV and other broadcasts.
